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 O’Connor’s book is very clear, easy to follow, and 
replete with excellent illustrations and analogies. Its 
clarity is outdone only by its virtuous attempt at overall 
fairness and sensitivity toward readers both religious and 
not. An excellent undergraduate book for classroom use, it 
is generally excellent in coverage of the issues as well as 
thoughtful and original in its own contributions. Although 
it is limited in its scope, covering the problem of evil, 
and arguments for God’s existence from design, it is a good 
book for general philosophy of religion courses, (if 
supplemented with others) but very good for more advanced 
undergraduate courses on the problem of evil or the design 
argument.  
 The book’s content is clearly laid out, with helpful 
summaries of the argument throughout. It is broken into six 
parts and twelve chapters. “Part I: Introduction” contains 
two chapters, one introducing the problems to be 
investigated and a second discussing terminology. “Part II: 
The Logic of God and Evil” has two chapters, covering the 
issue of whether God’s existence is impossible (the Mackie 
version of the logical problem of evil) and then 
Plantinga’s freewill defense of the possibility of God’s 
existence. “Part III: Design and Evil” has both chapters 
consider natural order, natural selection and supernatural 
design. “Part IV: Evil and Design (1)” covers first, 
Draper’s and Rowe’s arguments on the improbability of God’s 
existence given evil and second (in two more chapters) 
skeptical defenses from Wykstra and Van Inwagen and a 
evaluation of those defenses. “Part V: Evil and Design (2)” 
explains greater-good defenses from Hick and Swinburne, 
with a second chapter of evaluation. “Part VI: Taking 
Stock” draws together the author’s considered opinion on 
the overall argument. 
 The entire book is framed as an investigation into two 
questions. First, does the idea of God mesh with the vast 
amounts of suffering in the world? Second, when that 
suffering is taken into account alongside the good things, 
would it be reasonable to conclude that the world is best 
explained by the existence of God? The starting point, and 
a pedagogically useful tool, is the veil of ignorance 
modeled on Rawls suggestion.  The veil of ignorance for the 
first investigation is as follows: Imagine that we neither 
believe nor disbelieve in God. We retain all our knowledge 
of religion and other things. For the second investigation, 
the veil includes not just that we neither believe nor 
disbelieve in God but that we know nothing at all about 
religion, not even about its existence. Nor do we know 
anything about philosophy either. But we are rational, 
lucid and as curious as ever. The veil of ignorance is 
introduced, of course, to help generate as much objectivity 
as possible in the course of the investigation.  
 There are several separately presented, but ultimately 
connected, issues. The book considers the logical problem 
of evil as classically described by Mackie, and argues, 
following Platinga, that the case against God on strictly 
logical grounds fails. God’s existence is not impossible, 
given evil. What is particularly well done in this part of 
the book is the explanations of what is at stake in 
“logical” arguments dealing with possibility and 
impossibility and what needs to be done to “make a case.” 
O’Connor explains where the burden of proof lies and how 
heavy (or light) that burden is when discussing what is 
possible (or not).  
 Part III, chapter 5 includes sections on order and 
evolution, evolution and creation, evaluating the rival 
hypotheses. The hypothesis are a) this is the only universe 
and both natural order and the initial conditions are due 
to chance, b) this universe is one of many, those the 
chances of natural order and the initial conditions coming 
about are greater than if only one universe exists and c) 
the universe exists by design, thus order and the initial 
conditions were intentional. Chapter 6 includes sections on 
simplicity, problems surrounding consciousness and 
causation, conditions at the big bang, the design 
hypothesis and the occurrence of terrible things, and 
finally, the verdict. Here I quote: “The basic facts in the 
investigation are the deep orderliness in the universe, the 
occurrence at the Big Bang of the right conditions for life 
to evolve, the mix of pleasure and pain experienced by some 
living things, and the apparent pointlessness of much of 
that pain…. [O]ur investigation indicates that the idea of 
God would not come up as the overall best explanation.” (p. 
107). O’Connor is careful to admit that the idea of a 
personal cause might come up, but not the idea of God, 
given the veil of ignorance.  
 Part IV, Chapter 7 includes sections on keeping the 
problem in focus (making eight points about justified evils 
to provide a comparative standard), Draper’s indirect 
argument (which does not commit him to a naturalistic 
theory of the origin of the universe), and Rowe’s direct 
argument (which does so commit him). Chapter 8 presents Van 
Inwagen’s Goldilocks problem in a section on how much of a 
bad thing is too much, Wystra’s “noseeum” defense covering 
unreasonable expectations for knowing how God works and 
then Van Inwagen’s pre- and post-Garden of Eden defense. 
Chapter nine evaluates the skeptical defenses noting a 
serious side-effect of both Wykstra’s and Van Inwagen’s 
defenses, viz. they seem to make the concept of God 
virtually incomprehensible. Wykstra’s view has the 
additional problem of undercutting the very concept of 
theistic morality.  
 Part V, Chapter 10 compares Hick’s and Swinburne’s 
overlapping but distinct positions in the first section. 
This is followed by a brief consideration of libertarian 
freewill and its affect on our understanding of God, 
concluding that the defense works at a general level but 
leaves us with many puzzles amongst the details. In a 
section on natural disasters and the free-will defense, 
O’Connor takes up the soul-making theodicy and animal 
suffering. Chapter 11 includes sections on justified and 
compensated suffering and also death and the afterlife, 
along with a theistic variation on the hypothesis of 
indifference, and finally a verdict on the greater-good 
defense. The basic conclusion of the chapter is that we 
find no good justification for the evils that occur and 
that the introduction of an afterlife simply reraises the 
issues there, both for humans and for animals, or it leaves 
one wondering why God didn’t take humans and animals 
straight to the better life instead of dragging us through 
this one.   
 In the last chapter, O’Connor draws all his 
conclusions together in a clear presentation and balances 
them against individual religious experience. He concludes 
that although religious experience may ground a believer’s 
outlook, it is not evidence. We end up with a sort of 
détente between those who have the a certain sort of 
religious experience and those who do not.  
 As I said earlier, the book is a very good, clear 
introduction to two central and interconnected issues, 
design and evil, as they are related to the existence of 
God. I would recommend the book for use in the classroom 
for its clarity and fairness. But there are always some 
negatives. Here are a few minor notes. I’ll return to some 
larger issues below.  
First, O’Connor suggests that “Hinduism has 
monotheistic leanings. For its many Gods and Goddesses are 
seen within that faith as ultimately offshoots of one great 
God.” (p. 20) This oversimplifies Hinduism quite a bit and 
could be misleading to students. For example, Advaita 
Vendata Hinduism is atheistic completely. On p. 24 the 
suggestion is made there is a problem in moving from our 
own experience of personhood to the personhood of God, for 
we have no experience of personhood separate from 
embodiedness, the latter of which God doesn’t have. I’m not 
sure of the relevance of O’Connor’s point, since before we 
discovered our brains “did the thinking” we thought our 
souls or spirits did. (I’ll pick this up below as well).  
Also, O’Connor more or less identifies moral evils with sin 
(p. 26). This is a substantial short changing of the 
Christian notion of sin.  The notion of sin certainly 
includes moral evils but much more as well, such as 
relational issues toward God, ourselves, and nature. 
Related to this issue is O’Connor’s handling of Plantinga’s 
notion of original sin, which he says is stronger than the 
Christian notion of sin. He bases this claim on a quotation 
from Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. Seems like a fairly 
weak source for understanding something as complex as the 
“Christian” notion of original sin (which not even 
Christians agree on). One final quibble, I’m wonder why the 
book doesn’t deal with Plantinga’s way out of the 
evidential problem of evil.  
On to something larger than a quibble. First, on page 
29 the author writes, speaking of God and evil: “There is 
no philosophical problem about the latter without the 
concept of the former.” I demur. Surely there is a problem 
of evil even without God. When my late wife died, my then 
eleven-year old son wondered about God’s existence. I 
suggested to him that the world is full of evil and 
badness. With God, the world is mysterious. Without God not 
only is it mysterious but a lot more lonely. I think my 
intuitions were right. O’Connor appears to disagree.  In 
fact, it seems that evil is taken throughout the book as 
something a naturalist will just accept as obvious and 
(perhaps) to be expected in a universe without God. But 
why? There is a complicated and not so obvious story to be 
told by the naturalist about why we notice evil qua evil. 
Stated from the positive side, naturalist have what is 
sometimes called the “problem of the good.” Whence our 
sense of right and wrong? Is it objectively based, in a 
world sans God? If it is subjectively based only, then why 
would the human subjective understanding of morality really 
rule out God? Perhaps God has a different (even subjective) 
account of evil? In the end, don’t the claims of the book 
(recognizing that one author can only do so much in one 
book) need to balanced by a cogent evaluation of 
naturalism’s prospect of developing an objective moral 
view? And doesn’t that need doing before a conclusion can 
be reached on the subjects of the investigation? 
A second substantial issue is to wonder about whether 
objectivity (or even something close to it) is possible in 
philosophy, even given a veil of ignorance. There are a 
number of related subpoints here. First, it’s not clear to 
me that O’Connor’s separation of evidence and grounds is 
the best way to think of these matters. For example, many 
philosophers of religion believe religious or theistic 
experience provides not just psychological grounds but 
evidential grounds for religious or theistic belief. The 
so-called Reformed epistemology of Alvin Plantinga or 
William Alston’s understanding of perceiving God fall into 
this camp.   
Be that as it may, let’s focus on psychology and how 
it may play into rationality.  An interesting analogy is 
found in the case of forgeries in the plastic arts. When a 
forgery is discovered, even though the experts have viewed 
and considered the fake as authentic before the discovery, 
after the fact many experts are suddenly able to see many 
features of the work of art itself in virtue of which it is 
obviously fake. Prior to the discovery of the piece’s 
inauthenticity, no one noticed these features. I wonder if 
the difference between the religious believer who has 
experienced God in her life is something like the art 
expert who has shifted from viewing the art piece as 
authentic to viewing it as inauthentic. Maybe after 
conversion via religious experience, the believer simply 
sees things to which the religiously neutral person is 
blind. In short, I’d like to see some work done on the 
psychology of religious belief and experience themselves 
and how it plays into evaluating the presence of design or 
evil in the world. Not that I expect that in this book, but 
to take his approach, O’Connor and others who attempt such 
“neutrality” need, perhaps, to reconsider the role of the 
psychology of belief on what we can perceive or take in as 
believers.   
But the problems with the veil of ignorance have to do 
with more than my last point.  Let me illustrate a 
particular place in the book where I think the veil of 
ignorance may get a little out of hand. O’Connor writes: 
What is the substance of this conjectured entity? Of  
what stuff is it made? Considering the stipulation 
that the basic laws of nature cannot apply to it, 
because it is represented as having no physical 
properties at all, what positive characterization is 
to be given of it? 
 Behind the veil of ignorance, what resources are 
available for an answer? Perhaps an answer can be 
found in terms of felt consciousness, that is, in 
terms of how being conscious feels to us. Our 
awareness of pains and feelings and so on is not 
awareness of brain processes or any physical processes 
or states as such. In addition to pains and feelings, 
felt consciousness includes the experience of having 
intentions, making choices, and so on.  
 But there is strong reason to think such an 
account of the substance or nature of the alleged non-
physical designer would not do. For, while felt 
consciousness does not present to us the physical base 
of our awareness as such, the fact is that we have no 
acquaintance whatever with conscious beings not having 
such a base. Every conscious being we know of has a 
body. And there is no reason to suppose that fact is 
just a coincidence. Instead, there is good reason to 
think that a physical base is a necessary condition of 
consciousness in the first place. Both our common 
experience and the scientific literacy we retain 
behind the veil of ignorance strongly support the 
point. (p. 93) 
Here standing behind the veil of ignorance seems to do a 
disservice to the project. If we are ignorant of religion 
but not of science, aren’t we begging the question against 
the infinite vs. the finite person? While it is true that 
we know of no finite person for whom felt consciousness 
exits without a physical base, why think this would apply 
to something that perhaps only religious thought would give 
us, viz. an infinite person? Could it be that the veil of 
ignorance is not so much a veil as simply an 
(unintentional) ignoring of data that might be useful? 
 Parallel to that set of issues is a question about a 
particular claim of O’Connor’s on p. 7 where he writes: 
“Our examination here is of philosophical questions only. 
Purely religious questions will receive no further 
discussion.” Well, I know this is common move in philosophy 
of religion texts, but isn’t it sort of like saying “Let’s 
discuss morality, but make no assumptions about human 
nature”?  
 Most of these quibbles and even the more substantive 
issues make for good classroom discussion. In some sense, 
then, they add to the value of the book.  Like all good 
philosophy, there are toeholds toward a better 
understanding to be found in this work.  So, my questions 
aside, the book is a fine one, and very good for classroom 
use. It is generally even-handed and fair and where it may 
not be, it is not obviously intentionally ignoring issues. 
It is very clear and has helpful illustrations. I would not 
hesitate to use it in my own class room and recommend it to 
others.  
